This paper is an attempt to assessing the costs and benefits for Europeans from their empires overseas over five centuries, in particular, the net economic gains from empire over the long 19th century when mercantilism was replaced by free trade and over the period of reintegration and de-colonisation brought by the two World Wars. Paradoxically while empires were growing, empires were at best economically irrelevant for European long run growth in a free trade world. The post-1914 era shows that the benefits from imperial trading blocs were suboptimal solutions compared to open international trade.
1.
Introduction
Our essay will critically survey a growing volume of publications by historians which attempt to evaluate the costs and benefits for Europeans, flowing from some five centuries of involvement with empires overseas. That involvement began with the conquest of Cueta by the Portuguese in 1415 and passed through two epochs: 1415-1815 and 1815-1974 . After a first conjuncture marked by the French Revolution and a quarter of a century of global warfare, Britain emerged as the hegomic imperial power in Europe and its major rivals for commerce and dominion in Africa, Asia and the Americas (portugal, Spain, France and Holland) ceded control over parts of their possessions overseas to Britain or (in the cases of Spain and Portugal)~ lost sovereignty to local movements for independence in South America.
Before 1815-25 struggles for commerce, maritime bases, populations and territory overseas had persisted with frequent interludes of warfare for nearly four centuries. Thereafter, and as the mercantilist pursuit of power and profit subsided and was replaced by the liberal discourse of free trade, intellectuals began to question the whole enterprise and to construct national balance sheets for the acquisition and retention of empires overseas.
1 In historiographical terms, an overwhelming share of the published history of European imperialism and expansion overseas is concerned with the epoch of mercantilism 1415-1815 2 • Our survey proposes, however, to concentrate (vide parts 3 and 4) upon the macro-economic cost and benefits of empires as they evolved during the long 19 th century, 1815-1914, and over the period of reintegration and decolonization inaugurated and brought to a close by a second conjuncture -the world wars of the twentieth century. Europe's Macro-Economic Gains from the First Age ofhnperialism 1415-1815
The first epoch of European imperialism began with the colonization of Cueta in 1415 and ended with the Treaty of Vienna when France, Spain, Portugal (even Holland) virtually lost most of their empires overseas. Yet at that conjuncture" it was obvious that without some four centuries of the expansion of European power into Africa, Asia and above all into the Americas, all the economies of Europe would have been poorer, the composition of their national products would have been more agricultural and less industrial in form and lower proportions of their workforces would have been employed in industry and resident in towns. Over time Europeans had made gains from imperialism that took the tangible form. of: foodstuffs, raw materials, minerals and manufactured commodities imported from other continents that flowed into European ports -falteringly at first -but rapidly when their prices and costs fell after 1650. The list includes: tropical groceries (pepper, cinnamon, cloves, nutmegs, ginger, cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, groundnuts and tobacco); basic foodstuffs (fish and fish oils, maize, potatoes, tomatoes, beans, chillies, rhubarb; botanical medicines (cocaine, quinine, narcotics);
industrial raw materials (hardwoods, raw silk, cotton fibres, furs, wax, indigo, cochineal and other dyestuffs); manufactures (porcelain, jewels, textiles); and above all gold and silver from Southern
America 3 Yet the macro economic significance and ramifications of these concrete manifestations of bounty from trade and empire remains difficult to analyse and impossible to quantifY. Several European industries were based upon import substitution for products originally brought in from Asia and the Islamic world -including silk, cotton textiles, porcelain and jewellery. Furthermore, capital formation, the establishment of firms and the employment of labour had occurred to process the raw materials imported from other continents into European ports; and that had led on to the development of new industries including: silk and cotton textiles, the dyeing, printing and finishing of cloth, furniture made from hardwoods, sugar refining, coffee roasting, tobacco processing and chocolate making. 3 
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Imported spices, chillies, tomatoes, coffee, tea, cocoa and above all sugar, not only brought diversity into monotonous European diets but (together with the curative and energising properties of such botanical medicines as: tea, rhubarb, quinine, and fish oils) raised propensities and capacities to labour among national workforces. More significant were the calorific additions to basic food supplies and the contingent growth of populations and cities promoted by the introduction of maize and potatoes and from fish (caught in distant Atlantic waters). Feedbacks from imperial trades to the expansion of such major ports as Seville, Cadiz, Lisbon, Antwerp, Amsterdam. Bordeaux, London, Bristol, Glasgow and
Hamburg, and to the shipbuilding, shipping, commercial and financial services that fonned an integral part of their development and of the prosperity of their hinterlands are still visible today.4
Although massive imports of precious metals from the Americas and Africa are considered by historians to have constricted prospects for the long run economic development of Spain and Portugal, bullion turned out to be instnnnental for the development of a European and an international monetaty system. 5 Minted into coins and widely accepted as collateral for instruments of credit and paper circulation, silver and gold from Southern America and marginally from Africa, provided the basis for a necessary expansion in the supply of national and international money. Without that flexibility and because strategic goods and primary produce from Baltic economies could not be covered by commodity exports, intra-European trades from Northern to Western Europe and the Mediterranean would surely have been constrained?6
Trade with China, India and other parts of Asia could also have been seriously constricted because for long stretches of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, approximately three quarters of the commodities purchased in Asia could not be covered by revenues received from Europe's Liberal observations that the overall scale of imperial enterprise had become rather tangential for Italian, German, Belgium, Spanish, Portuguese and French economic progress, carried less currency for the Dutch and even less conviction for the British cases -if only because the material gains from empire looked tangible for certain regions, industries and for politically powerful groups within those Protestant kingdoms. Nevertheless the overall economic significance of empires for the long run development of these two economies (indeed for any national economy) is best exposed by a three column tabulation designed to show the relative scales (ratios) of commodity, factor and fiscal flows within the home economy compared to flows to and from the domestic economy and its empire which can in turn be contrasted with flows between the home country and the rest of the international economy. In every European case, for which data is available, interconnexions through (i) the export and import of goods and services, (ii) migration, (iii) net flows of funds on invested overseas (interest, profits and dividends) and other economic links with the rest of the world economy look immeasurably more important than links with empires. Some combination of protectionism with slower growth seems to be a more realistic conjecture to pursue. On this assumption a paradigm paper by Edelstein offers estimates for the short tenn decline in national income that might counterfactually, have followed from loss of political control over the very largest of European empires overseas -the British empire. His estimates come to somewhere between 1.6 per cent and 4.3 per cent of national income for 1870 and 4.9 per cent to 6.5 per cent for 1913.
These ratios are not small. They depend, however, upon a specified set of assumptions about tariff rates, e1asticities of demand and levels of trade that might have been obtained in the absence of British rule and influence. This implies they are upper bound numbers because the resources used to produce exports for the colonies are assumed to have zero opportunity cost and are not reallocated, The taxonomy of these arguments is critically appraised in Cain, 'Was it worth having', pp. 351-376 Edelstein, 1mperialism: cost and benefit ', pp. 197-216 sudden loss of protected markets. 39 There is no reason to suppose that the more flexible and efficient export industries of Britain. France and Gennany (even Portugal) would not have adjusted even more readily to a "phased withdrawal" from empire or any involvement in imperial enterprise over the second half of the long nineteenth century.40
For that period it is, moreover, difficult to find examples of imports from European empires that could not be procured from non imperial sources at similar and (for several' exploited' European populations) at lower prices. To sum up: plausible estimates for the net benefits derived by the British and other economies from trade with their empires suggest that after mid century the net benefits could not have been other than "sm~" -possibly as low as 2 per cent of gross national products. Before the Great War opportunities to trade and invest within the international economy as a whole continued to be relatively unconstrained and economic arguments for closer imperial integration that emerged even before the end of the nineteenth century, did not seem compelling enough to shift European commercial policies in radically new directions. For more than a decade after la fm de siecle, the appeal of empire looks more atavistic and xenophobic than material.
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Unfortunately, the Great War pushed almost all European economies towards autarky, constricted the political boundaries of commodity and factor markets and reintroduced serious militaIy considerations into the discourse about the costs and benefits of empires. That occurred because during and in the wake of war, sales of exports, the procurement of food, raw materials and militaIy goods, the recruitment of manpower from protected and secure sources of supply provided by colonies had become "strategic necessities". More rapid rates of recovery often depended upon importing capital goods, raw materials and skilled manpower, which rendered foreign trade and/or capacities to borrow on international money markets even more important after than they had been before the Great War.
Unfortunately that expensive conflict not only depleted Europe's stocks of physical and human capital but seriously dislocated the system of international trade and payments upon which investment and future growth had depended. For many years after 1918 international economic relations continued to be afflicted by the consequences of the Versailles Treaty, by state controls enacted to wage war and above all by the malign legacies of financial strategies pursued by governments to fund massive expenditures on their azmed forces between 1914-18. Although taxes per head had more than doubled in real terms) European states had borrowed most of the money they needed for warfare from their banks.
Thus the problems of how to squeeze inflation out of the system and how to bring national price levels While it would be impossible to predict how the international order might have developed without the catastrophe of the Great War, from the vantage point of that long boom in the world economy, from 1899-1914, there would seem to be no need to be other than optimistic about future prospects. Growth rates for production and foreign trade, for migration and capital flows across frontiers, had attained record levels. European economies seemed to be adjusting to ,the realities of international competition, including the appearance of Japan but more importantly to the rapid rise of the United States, which as early as the 1890s had emerged as the hegemonic industrial power of the twentieth century. Middle East and the Pacific, will surely be represented as "all costs and no benefits". That conclusion will be reinforced when historians add to the unprofitable legacy of attempts at imperial renewal, quantified conjectures for the economic value of metropolitan property destroyed and expropriated by nationalist movements, as well as the costs of the disorder and depression that invariably affiicted former colonial economies for many years after their armed struggles to "seize" independence. (Algeria has now become simply the most dramatic case in point)92
Given the size of its empire, the United Kingdom decolonized more cheaply than other imperial powers. Furthermore, Britain had also drawn far more heavily than any other European nations upon the resources of its empire and commonwealth to defeat Germany and (through the sterling area) to assist the home economy to recover after the Second World War. 93 Nevertheless, the imperial contribution towards victory in Europe, the security of the realm and post war recovery needs to be compared with resources supplied to wage war by the kingdom itself: by Russia and other allies and above all by the United States. Historians might well regard any attempt to draw distinctions between imperial and national defence as moot, economists will realistically suggest that Britain's dominions and the colonies participated in a "virtual alliance" of quasi autonomous political units constructed and funded to protect their own independence and integrity against the predatory intentions of Germany and 
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How economically superior modern history might have turned out for Britain and the rest of imperial Europe if Cobden's and Hobson's recommendations for decoupling from empires had occurred in the late nineteenth rather than at the end of this turbulent century? Meanwhile, the thrust of our essay has been concerned to challenge, the widespread perception that European economies made gains from conquest and colonisation in Africa, Asia and Southern America that were somehow indispensable or at least hugely significant for their long term. development.
In conclusion it may be interesting to offer some speculations as to why imperialism turned out to be less than profitable for several European states most actively and consistently involved in expansion and enterprise overseas?
Since European governments together with private investors persisted with various forms of colonial rule on and off for nearly five centuries, it must be the case that they believed that their policies Furthermore, and until very late in the day, European governments, merchants and businessmen failed to invest at anywhere near the levels required in the infrastructural facilities and human capital formation in order to ensure that their political rule over colonial populations, natural resources and under-exploited assets in Africa, Asia, and South America became really profitable.
North America was another story but the discovery and exploitation of that sub continent crowded out
European investment elsewhere in the world economy.
Meanwhile, and for two reasons, the costs of rule (including coercion and the extension of incentives designed to secure collaboration between the colonised and the colonisers) increased through time. Even among the more ruthless of imperial states, capacities for control remained geographically, politically and economically constrained by the resources and instruments for the exercise of power at their disposal. When the technologies for stronger more intrusive government gradually improved, they faced growing resistance from nationalistic movements for colonial freedom which raised the costs of coercion within empires and also at home within the metropolis.
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Local resistance certainly mattered particularly when it came to time to depart and when the reluctance to leaving by some European governments inflicted a fmal round of heavy costs upon several metropolitan economies. Finally, throughout the five centuries or more of European expansion overseas, the context of great power politics within which imperialism occurred promoted rivalry, mercantilism and warfare among the states which is perhaps the major reason why the potential gains to
Europe from overseas expansion, colonisation and trade were dissipated and at this end of the twentieth century look so disappointing.
